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This paper demonstrates how time consistency of the Ramsey policy–the optimal ﬁscal
and monetary policy under commitment–can be achieved. Each government should leave its
successor with a unique maturity structure for the nominal and indexed debt, such that the
marginal beneﬁt of a surprise inﬂation exactly balances the marginal cost. Unlike in earlier
papers on the topic, the result holds for quite a general Ramsey policy, including timevarying
polices with positive inﬂation and positive nominal interest rates. We compare our results with
those in Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1987), Calvo and Obstfeld (1990), and Alvarez, Kehoe,
and Neumeyer (2004).
JEL Classiﬁcation: E310, E520, H210
Keywords: time consistency, Ramsey policy, surprise inﬂation
∗This paper extends Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1989), a reply to Calvo and Obstfeld’s (1990) comment on
Persson, Persson and Svensson (1987). We thank participants in a seminar at the Wharton School for comments,
Mirco Tonin for research assistance, and Kathleen Hurley for secretarial and editorial assistance. Lars Svensson
thanks the Center for Economic Policy Studies, Princeton University, for ﬁnancial support.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Time consistency of optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy has been extensively discussed in the lit-
erature on the macroeconomics of public ﬁnance. Calvo’s [3] seminal paper pointed to the ex post
incentives for a government to use a surprise inﬂation to reduce the real value of any outstanding
ﬁat money, when other sources of ﬁnance distort economic activity. Lucas and Stokey [7] (hence-
forth LS) extended Calvo’s analysis by showing how similar time-consistency problems arise in a
real economy due to the government’s ability to manipulate the market value of indexed debt. In
addition, they showed that these problems can be avoided if every government undertakes a unique
restructuring scheme of the maturity (and contingency) of the indexed debt left to its successor.
LS also argued, however, that the time-consistency problem is unavoidable in a monetary economy,
where governments always have an ex post incentive to reduce (increase) the real value of net
nominal government liabilities (assets) by a surprise inﬂation, so as to lower distortionary taxes.
Counter to this, Persson, Persson, and Svensson [9] (henceforth PPS) suggested that a unique
restructuring of both nominal and indexed debt could resolve both types of time-consistency prob-
lems. More precisely, PPS suggested that the ﬁrst-order conditions for optimal ﬁscal and monetary
policy in a sequence of discretionary equilibria could be made identical to the corresponding ﬁrst-
order conditions for the Ramsey policy–the optimal policy under commitment. One of their
conditions for the nominal debt structure is that each government leaves its successor with a total
value of nominal claims on the private sector equal to the money stock, such that net nominal
liabilities are zero, which appeared to remove the incentive for a surprise inﬂation. By applying
an informal but innovative variation argument, however, Calvo and Obstfeld [4] (henceforth CO)
could show that the solution proposed by PPS is in fact not an optimum.
A recent paper by Alvarez, Kehoe, and Neumeyer [2] (henceforth AKN) reexamined the time
consistency of the optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy in a setting very similar to that of LS, PPS,
and CO, except that they assumed that private-sector preferences satisfy conditions that imply that
the Friedman rule, a zero nominal interest rate, is optimal (see section 6 for these conditions). Under
the Friedman rule, AKN then demonstrated that the Ramsey policy can be made time consistent:
This is achieved by the LS conditions on the indexed debt structure plus the PPS condition of
zero government net nominal liabilities. As AKN noted, however, under the Friedman rule their
monetary economy becomes isomorphic to a non-monetary economy–indeed, the non-monetary
economy examined by LS. The AKN result is thus to a large extent a restatement of the LS result.
1Given the results in the literature, it would thus appear that the time-consistency problem
of optimal policy is unavoidable in genuinely monetary economies; that is, in economies where
monetary instruments and nominal assets and liabilities play an essential role in shaping equilibrium
allocations and raising some revenue for the government and the Friedman rule is not optimal. Such
a conclusion is premature, however.
In a reply to the ﬁrst version of CO, Persson, Persson, and Svensson [10] (henceforth PPS2)
showed that the problem with the PPS result arose because of the assumption that surprise inﬂation
entails no direct costs for the private sector, in addition to the indirect costs via lower wealth. To
illustrate this, PPS2 proposed a simple way to incorporate a direct cost of surprise inﬂation, namely
to tie the provision of liquidity services to beginning-of-period real balances rather than end-of
period ones. They then indicated how to restore the result that a unique restructuring scheme for
the nominal and indexed government debt makes the Ramsey policy time consistent. One of their
conditions is that each government should leave its successor with positive net nominal liabilities, in
order to balance the beneﬁt of a surprise inﬂation against the cost of higher distortions.1 Because
PPS2 remained unpublished, the restoration of result that careful debt restructuring may salvage
time consistency of the Ramsey policy is not widely known.2
Beyond demonstrating that time consistency of the Ramsey policy is possible in genuinely
monetary economies, we think the result in PPS2 is valuable for at least two reasons. First, and
most importantly, it is plainly unrealistic that surprise inﬂations entail no direct costs whatsoever.
A neutral, unanticipated increase in the price level could never be done instantaneously because
of various nominal rigidities and contract lags. Economic agents will thus have the opportunity
to take costly action to reduce their losses or increase their gains. A surprise inﬂation will also
typically have undesirable wealth redistribution eﬀects, cause some bankruptcies, increase search
costs in markets, and so fourth.3 Second, the result enlarges the set of economic environments
where time consistency can be achieved. One of AKN’s necessary conditions for time-consistent
policy implies a unitary income elasticity of real balances, which is far from universally observed
in the data. Moreover, their assumption of no initial outstanding nominal liabilities is very strong.
Perhaps it is not a coincidence that we rarely observe policies leading to zero nominal interest rates,
1 AKN do not refer at all to PPS2 and its main result–the restoration of time consistency of the Ramsey
policy under beginning-of-period real balances and distortionary costs of surprise inﬂation–even though they brieﬂy
refer to beginning-of-period real balances (their main result is demonstrated for end-of-period real balances). The
working-paper version of AKN, [1], does refer to PPS2, but not to its main result.
2 Although PPS and CO’s comment on PPS were published in Econometrica,t h ee d i t o ro fEconometrica declined
to publish our reply to CO.
3 See Persson, Persson, and Svensson [11] for a case study of the possibilities for and consequences of an attempt
to dramatically increase inﬂation in Sweden in order to reduce the real value of the nominal public debt.
2as implied by these conditions.
In this paper, we build on and extend the analysis in PPS2. Section 2 lays out a model of
a monetary economy, where the Friedman rule need not be optimal, and where the government
may thus optimally raise some revenue from anticipated inﬂation. The economy’s Ramsey policy
and equilibrium is characterized in section 3. We then demonstrate, in section 4, how a careful
restructuring of the nominal and indexed debt makes the Ramsey policy time consistent under
discretion. As an illustration of our results, section 5 presents two simple numerical examples. In
section 6, we compare our analysis and results to those in the original PPS setup and suggestion,
the CO comment, and the recent AKN paper. Section 7 presents some conclusions.
2 The model
Our model follows quite closely those in LS and PPS, although the notation is somewhat modiﬁed.4
Thus, we consider an economy with a representative consumer and a government. Time is discrete
and separated into periods, t =0 , 1, 2,.... For simplicity, all uncertainty is assumed away and
the consumer and the government have perfect foresight; our results can be easily generalized to
an economy with uncertainty and state-contingent debt. A single good is produced with a simple
linear technology, according to the resource constraint,
ct + xt + gt ≤ 1. (1)
Given a unitary endowment of time in each period, ct is consumption of the representative consumer
in period t, xt is her leisure (so 1−xt is the consumer’s supply of labor producing the same amount
of goods), and gt is (exogenous) government consumption.
The consumer’s preferences in a given period θ are given by the intertemporal utility function
∞ P
t=θ
βt−θU(ct,x t,m t), (2)
where β ∈ (0,1) is a discount factor and U(ct,x t,m t) is the period utility function. We let
mt ≡ Mt−1/Pt (3)
denote beginning-of-period real balances, where Mt−1 is money carried over from the previous
period and held in the beginning of period t and Pt is the price level in period t.T h u s , i m p o r -
tantly, beginning-of-period real balances, Mt−1/Pt, rather than end-of-period real balances, Mt/Pt,
4 The real part of the model in LS and PPS are identical, except that PPS for simplicity abstract from uncertainty.
LS introduce money via a cash/credit goods distinction, whereas PPS introduce it via money in the utility function.
3provide liquidity services and facilitate transactions during period t.5 The period utility function
is concave, twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing in ct and xt (so the resource and
budget constraints will bind in equilibrium), and increasing in mt. For simplicity, the period utility
function is assumed additively separable, so the cross derivatives satisfy Ucx = Ucm = Uxm =0 ,
although we shall indicate that our results do not depend on this simpliﬁcation.









Here, qθ,t denotes the present value in period θ of goods in period t,a n dτt denotes proportional
taxes on labor income levied by the government. Furthermore, t−1bs ≷ 0 denotes net claims by
the consumer when entering period t on the amount of goods to be delivered by the government
in period s,a n dt−1Bs ≷ 0 denotes net claims on money to be delivered by the government in
period s. From the point of view of the government in period t, t−1bs and t−1Bs denote indexed
and nominal debt service (the sum of maturing principal and interest payments) due in period s.
Hence, t−1b ≡ {t−1bs}∞
s=t and t−1B ≡ {t−1Bs}∞
s=t denote the maturity structure of the indexed and
nominal government debt, respectively, that is outstanding at the beginning of period t.







Adding the period budget constraints (4) for t ≥ θ and using (5), we can write the consumer’s













For given current and future present-value prices, interest rates, and taxes, and for given initial
money stock and indexed and nominal claims on the government, optimal choices by the consumer
of {ct,x t,M t}∞
t=θ result in the ﬁrst-order conditions,









5 The assumption that beginning-of-period real balances give liquidity services is used, for instance, in Danthine
and Donaldson [5].
6 We surpress the dependence of it+1 on θ. As is evident from equation (9) below, there is no such dependence in
a consumer equlibrium.
7 Throughout, we assume that the appropriate no-Ponzi-game and transversality conditions are fullﬁlled.
4for t ≥ θ,w h e r eUct ≡ ∂U(ct,x t,m t)/∂ct, and so forth, and we normalize present-value prices to
units of utility in period θ.
The government in period t ﬁnances its exogenous consumption by taxing labor income, in-
creasing the money supply, and borrowing, while taken as given the initial money stock and the







qt,s(t−1bs+ t−1Bs/Ps)−qt,tgt ≥ 0,
(10)
where the third term is the value of the indexed and nominal debt held at the end of period t
(beginning of period t +1 ) . Multiplying by βt−θ, using (7), summing (10) for t ≥ θ, and using (5)






qθ,titmt − qθ,θMθ−1/Pθ −
∞ P
t=θ
qθ,t(θ−1bt + θ−1Bt/Pt) −
∞ P
t=θ
qθ,tgt ≥ 0. (11)
3 Optimal policy under commitment
What is the optimal policy for a government that, in period θ, can decide on current and future
taxes and money supplies, {τt,M t}∞
t=θ, and commit future governments to implement these deci-
sions? The government chooses these policy instruments to maximize the consumer’s intertemporal
utility, subject to its budget constraint, (11), the initial money stock, Mθ−1, the initial indexed and
nominal debt, θ−1b and θ−1B, the economy’s resource constraint, (1), and consumer optimization,
represented by (7)—(9).8
It is convenient to reformulate this problem such that government in period θ directly chooses
the price level, Pθ, and the allocation of current and future consumption and real balances,
Xθ ≡ {ct,m t+1}
∞
t=θ, instead of the policy instruments, {τt,M t}∞
t=θ: First, we use the binding
resource constraint to eliminate xt in the consumer’s intertemporal utility function, and deﬁne the
government’s objective function in period θ as
Vθ(Pθ,X θ) ≡ U(cθ,1 − gθ − cθ,M θ−1/Pθ)+
∞ X
t=θ+1
βt−θU(ct,1 − gt − ct,m t).
Second, we use the resource constraint to eliminate xt and write the government’s budget constraint
in period θ as
∞ X
t=θ










/Pθ ≥ 0. (12)
8 T h eg o v e r n m e n t ’ sb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n ta n dt h er e s o u r c ec o n straint ensure that the consumer’s budget constraint
is fulﬁlled.
5The expression inside the parenthesis in the third term on the left side is the net nominal liabilities
of the government in period θ. Dividing this by Pθ and multiplying by qθ,θ give the real present
value (in units of utility) of the government’s net nominal liabilities. Here, Qθ,t denotes the nominal










(t ≥ θ +1 ) .
(13)
N e x t ,w eu s et h er e s o u r c ec o n s t r a i n tt oe l i m i n a t ext in the ﬁrst-order-conditions (7)—(9), take the
additive separability of the utility function into account, and deﬁne the functions qθ,t = qθ,t(ct) and
τt = τ(ct) for t ≥ θ,a n dit = i(ct,m t) for t ≥ θ +1 , according to91 0
qθ,t(ct) ≡ βt−θUc(ct), (14)
τ(ct) ≡ 1 −







Finally, under the convention that qθ,t, τt,a n dit in (12) are functions of (ct,m t) and that Qθ,t(Xθ)





subject to the implementability constraint,
Wθ(Pθ,X θ) ≥ 0, (18)
















as the generalized net wealth of the government in period θ. In equilibrium, the net wealth of the
government will always be zero. We shall refer to an increase (decrease) in Wθ as a slackening
(tightening) of the government’s intertemporal budget constraint.
9 Without the assumption of separability, the arguments (ct,1 − gt − ct,m t) would enter in all derivatives of the
utility function.
10 From our assumption about concavity, twice continuous diﬀerentiability of the period utility function, and
additive separability, the derivatives of the functions deﬁned by (14)—(16) fulﬁll ∂pt/∂ct < 0, ∂τt/∂ct < 0, ∂it/∂ct > 0,
and ∂it/∂mt < 0.
6Thus, according to this reformulation, the government directly chooses the allocation Xθ =
{ct,m t+1}∞
t=θ and the initial price level, Pθ. The Lagrangian for the problem is
Lθ = Vθ(Pθ,X θ)+λθWθ(Pθ,X θ), (20)
where λθ ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier of (18). The ﬁrst-order conditions for an optimal policy in


















=0 ( t ≥ θ +1 ) , (23)
with the complementary slackness condition
λθWθ(Pθ,X θ) ≥ 0.
We assume that the exogenous government consumption and the initial debt structure is such
that λθ > 0, so the government’s intertemporal budget constraint is strictly binding. Then, the
ﬁrst-order conditions, (21)—(23), together with the budget constraint, (18) with equality, determine
Pθ, {ct,m t+1}∞
t=θ, and λθ in the Ramsey equilibrium. The corresponding prices and interest rates
{qθ,t,i t+1}∞
t=θ are then determined by (14) and (16), and leisure {xt}∞
t=θ by the binding resource
constraint, (1). Given Pθ, the future price levels, {Pt}∞
t=θ+1, then follow from (5). Finally, the
policy instruments, {τt,M t}∞
t=θ, are determined by (15) and (3).
Let vθ(Mθ−1, θ−1b, θ−1B,{gt}∞
t=θ) denote the optimal value of this problem. By (19), (20), and




Evidently, we can interpret λθ ≥ 0 as the marginal cost of public funds, a measure of the distortion
caused by taxation. If λθ =0 , taxation is nondistortionary, as it would be if we allowed for lumpsum
taxes.11 We will only study equilibria where λθ is positive. Then, higher government indexed debt
service to the private sector in period t requires an increase in taxation which reduces consumer
utility, even though the consumer directly receives the debt payment.
The ﬁrst-order conditions, (21)—(23), and the deﬁnition of Wθ, (19), illustrate that, in general,
the Ramsey policy depends on the initial debt structure. This is because net government wealth
11 Note that, since the left side of (24) and qθ,t on the right side both have the dimension of utility per good, λθ is
deﬁned such that it is a dimensionless number.
7depends on the market value of the outstanding debt and because the government’s policy choices
have an eﬀect of the market value through its eﬀect on nominal and real interest rates (present-value
prices).12 When the indexed and nominal debt service inherent in the initial maturity structure is
not constant over time, the Ramsey policy does not generally prescribe constant taxes and interest
rates over time, even if government spending is constant.
4 Time consistency under discretion
Consider now the situation when the government in oﬃce in any period t can reoptimize under
discretion. As demonstrated by LS–and more recently by AKN–the Ramsey policy is, in general,
time inconsistent under discretion, because the incentives to manipulate price levels and interest
rates change over time. We now argue, as in PPS, that these incentives can be neutralized: By
leaving a uniquely deﬁned indexed and nominal debt structure, each government can induce the
next one to implement the Ramsey policy, even if the next government reoptimizes under discretion.
Suppose the government in period θ (called government θ) has solved the Ramsey problem in the
previous section for the optimal price level Pθ and allocation {ct,m t+1}∞
t=θ, and the corresponding
{qθ,t,i t+1}∞
t=θ, {Pt}∞
t=θ+1,a n d{τt,M t}∞
t=θ.G o v e r n m e n t θ would like the government in the next
period, government θ +1, to choose the continuation of this Ramsey policy, when reoptimizing for
given Mθ, θb,a n d θB.W h a td e b ts t r u c t u r e ,θb and θB, should government θ leave to government
θ +1?
We can answer this question by ﬁxing Pθ+1 and {ct,m t+1}∞
t=θ+1 at the values preferred by
government θ and ﬁnding the debt structure that satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order conditions (21)—(23) for









where Um,θ+1 denotes Um(Mθ/Pθ+1) (without the assumption of additive separability, cθ+1 and
1 − gθ+1 − cθ+1 would also enter as arguments). We assume that government θ knows λθ+1 > 0,
the cost of public funds for government θ +1 ; we show below how λθ+1 is determined. The left
side of (25) corresponds to government θ +1 ’s direct marginal cost of unanticipated inﬂation in










8period θ +1 , that is, an unanticipated rise in the price level, Pθ+1. Unanticipated inﬂation lowers
the real balances in the beginning of period θ +1, Mθ/Pθ+1, in proportion to the given beginning-
of-period money stock, Mθ. This imposes a marginal utility cost measured by the left side of (25).
It is positive as long as the Ramsey policy chosen by government θ implies a positive value of
iθ+1 = Um,θ+1/Uc,θ+1. The right side of (25) corresponds to government θ +1 ’s marginal beneﬁt
of unanticipated inﬂation. Within the parenthesis is the government’s net nominal liabilities at
the beginning of period θ +1 , the sum of the money stock and the nominal value of the nominal
debt, the real value of which are eroded by an unanticipated rise in the price level. The resulting
slackening of the government’s intertemporal budget constraint allows the government to reduce
the distortions due to labor taxes or anticipated inﬂation. Multiplication by the cost of public funds
gives the corresponding increase in consumer utility. To satisfy condition (25) at the predetermined
value of Mθ and thus eliminate the incentive for a surprise inﬂation, the value of the nominal debt,
P∞
t=θ+1 Qθ+1,t θBt, must be such that net nominal liabilities are positive.
Condition (25) can also be written as
∞ X
t=θ+1







where we have used (14) and (16). If iθ+1 <λ θ+1, according to (26), government θ should leave
government θ +1with negative nominal debt (positive nominal bond holdings), although less in
absolute value than the money stock, so as to leave net nominal liabilities positive. If iθ+1 >λ θ+1,
government θ should leave government θ+1with positive nominal debt. The nominal debt is lower
(the nominal bond holdings are larger), when (i) the lower is the interest rate, iθ+1 (and thereby
the cost of unanticipated inﬂa t i o ni n( 2 5 ) ,w h i c hi sp r o p o r t i o n a lt oUm,θ+1 and iθ+1), and (ii) the
higher is the cost of public funds, λθ+1 (and thereby the beneﬁt of unanticipated inﬂa t i o ni n( 2 5 ) ) .
The incentives to renege on Pθ+1 and the way to neutralize them are quite easy to grasp. But
the time consistency problem associated with the other policy instruments is more subtle. The















where the derivative ∂it/∂mt is the derivative of the function deﬁned by (16) (without the assump-
tion of additive separability, derivatives of qθ+1,t and τt with respect to mt would also enter), and
9where we use that
∂Qθ+1,s
∂mt






(s ≥ t, t ≥ θ +2 ) .
T h el e f ts i d eo f( 2 7 )i st h ed i r e c tmarginal beneﬁt of increasing real balances in period t ≥ θ+2.
The bracketed term on the right side is the corresponding tightening of the government’s budget
constraint: the fall in the present value of the government’s net wealth, due to a fall in seigniorage
and a rise in the present value of the nominal debt because of a lower interest rate it (note that
∂it/∂mt < 0 by footnote 10). Multiplication by λθ+1, the cost of public funds, gives the marginal
cost of increasing real balances in period t from the viewpoint of government θ +1 .A sb o t ht h e
debt structure
P∞
t=θ+1 Qθ+1,t θBt and the cost of public funds, λθ+1, generally take diﬀerent values
in period θ+1than in period θ, (27) generally implies a diﬀerent value of mt than the optimal value
for government θ. To imply the same solution for {mt+1}∞
t=θ+1 (when we hold {ct}∞
t=θ+1 constant











(t ≥ θ +2 ) , (28)
where
Et ≡ (1 + it)βt−θ−1 Umt
−∂it/∂mt
, (29)







Since equation (28) determines the maturity structure θBt for t ≥ θ+2 and equation (26) determines
θBθ+1, we have now determined the complete nominal debt structure for any value of λθ+1. The
equilibrium value of λθ+1 is determined below.
In a similar vein, the ﬁrst-order condition for ct (t ≥ θ +1 ) for government θ +1is
Uc,θ+1 − Ux,θ+1 = λθ+1
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
− [τθ+1(cθ+1 + gθ+1) − gθ+1 − θbθ+1]
∂qθ+1,θ+1
∂cθ+1









⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
− [τt(ct + gt)+itmt − gt − θbt]
∂qθ+1,t
∂ct










⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
(t ≥ θ +2 ) , (32)
10where the derivatives of qθ+1,t, τt,a n dit refer to the functions (14)—(16) (the same derivatives would
enter also without the assumption of additive separability). The left side is the direct marginal
utility gain of increasing ct (and simultaneously reducing xt). On the right side within the curly
brackets is the marginal cost of tightening the government’s intertemporal budget constraint, due
to the changes in present-value prices, tax rates, and interest rates. How can we guarantee that
these conditions imply time consistent choices for {ct}∞
t=θ+1? If we keep cθ+1 ﬁxed at its Ramsey
value and the nominal debt structure at the value determined by (26) and (28), any (positive) λθ+1
determines a unique θbθ+1 that satisﬁes equation (31). Similarly, equation (32) determines θbt for
t ≥ θ+2. Using (25) and (28)—(30) to eliminate the nominal claims in (31) and (32), we can rewrite
the equations for θb as




θbt = τt(ct + gt) − gt + itmt −
Gt
λθ+1










τθ+1 − (cθ+1 + gθ+1)(−∂τθ+1/∂cθ+1)
−∂qθ+1,θ+1/∂cθ+1
,




(t ≥ θ +2 ) ,
Ht ≡− qθ+1,t




(t ≥ θ +2 ) .
Hence, equations (33) and (34) determine the indexed debt structure, θb, that government θ should
leave to government θ +1 .
Equations (26), (28), (33), and (34) pin down the incentive-compatible debt structure for gov-
ernment θ +1 , given its cost of public funds, λθ+1. The last step of our solution is to ensure that,
at the equilibrium value of λθ+1, this debt structure is consistent with the budget constraints of
governments θ and θ +1 .T h u s ,w eﬁnd the value of λθ+1 that makes the value of the total gov-
ernment debt (θb, θB) consistent with the budget constraint of government θ +1,w h i c hi nt u r n
makes it consistent with the budget constraint of government θ. To do that, we subtract θbθ+1 and
θbt from both sides of (33) and (34), respectively, multiply by qθ+1,θ+1 and qθ+1,t,s u mf o rt ≥ θ+1,



























This ensures that the cost of public funds and the debt structure are consistent with the budget











Solving for λθ+1 gives
λθ+1 =
P∞
t=θ+1 qθ+1,tGt − Um,θ+1mθ+1 P∞
t=θ+1 qθ+1,tHt
. (35)
Given the equilibrium cost of public funds in (35), we can then use (26), (28), (33), and (34)
to determine the unique debt structure that induces government θ +1to implement the Ramsey
policy under discretion.
5E x a m p l e s
In this section, we provide two concrete numerical examples,13 where the initial nominal debt
of government θ is positive, so the initial net nominal liabilities including the money stock are
deﬁnitely positive. Nevertheless, there exists a Ramsey policy for government θ and a maturity
structure for the nominal and indexed debt that government θ can leave for government θ +1 ,
such that the Ramsey policy is time consistent, even if government θ +1reoptimizes under discre-
tion. Furthermore, inﬂation and nominal interest rates are positive, and the Friedman rule is not
optimal.14





[(1 − ct)2 +( 1− xt)2 +( 1− mt)2]. (36)
The discount factor satisﬁes β =0 .9. We assume that government consumption is constant from
period θ, gt =0 .2 (t ≥ θ). With this government consumption, the nondistorted consumption and
leisure levels are both 0.4. The initial money stock in period θ is normalized to unity, Mθ−1 =1 .
13 The Matlab programs implementing the numerical solution in the text are available on request from the authors.
14 With the utility function assumed, consumption and real balances are not weakly homogeneously separable from
leisure, and not quasi-separable from leisure, so the utility function does not fulﬁll the conditions assumed by AKN,
and the Friedman rule is not necessarily optimal (see section 6 and footnote 17 for details).
15 The period utility function is strictly increasing for ct < 1, xt < 1,a n dmt < 1, and our equilibria fall in that
region.
12Example 1 We consider government θ as the ﬁrst government to solve the Ramsey problem (17)
and (19). We assume that government θ has inherited positive nominal debt that matures in period
θ only: θ−1Bθ =1 , and θ−1Bt =0(t ≥ θ +1 ) . There is also positive indexed debt in the form of a
consol: θ−1bt =0 .1 (t ≥ θ).
The resulting Ramsey policy (rounded to three decimal points) satisﬁes
Mθ =2 .479,
Pθ =2 .308,
cθ =0 .396,c t =0 .291 (t ≥ θ +1 ) ,
mθ =0 .433,m t =0 .758 (t ≥ θ +1 ) .
The Ramsey policy reaches a steady state after one period. Government θ has a strong incentive to
engage in an initial surprise inﬂation: to reduce the real value of both the initial money stock and
the initial nominal debt. Following these incentives, it prints a great deal of new money, increasing
the money stock by 148 percent to 2.479, thereby raising the price level to 2.308, and reducing
real money balances to 0.433. If the real balances and consumption level had been anticipated in
period θ − 1, the resulting interest rate would have been a high 93.8 percent, iθ =0 .938. Future
nominal interest rates are positive and lower but still substantial: it =0 .341 (t ≥ θ+1). Obviously,
the Friedman rule is far from optimal. The future inﬂation rates are also high: πθ+1 =0 .417 and
πt =0 .207 (t ≥ θ +2 ).16 The labor tax rate is close to zero in the initial period, τθ =0 .013, while
the tax rate in all future periods is higher: τt =0 .307 (t ≥ θ +1 ). As a result, the consumption
level is close to the nondistorted level in period θ, but lower from the next period on. The marginal
cost of public funds satisﬁes λθ =0 .469; a marginal increase in distortionary taxes reduces utility
by 47 percent more than a marginal increase in (hypothetical) lumpsum taxes.
To implement the Ramsey policy in the future, government θ should leave government θ +1
with the following debt structure:
θBθ+1 = −0.644, θBθ+2 = −0.037,
∞ X
t=θ+1
Qθ+1,t θBt = −0.918,
θbθ+1 = −0.315, θbt =0 .186 (t ≥ θ +2 ) .
Government θ had a strong incentive to engage in an initial surprise inﬂation. To curb the corre-
sponding incentive for its successor, government θ leaves the successor with a very diﬀerent nominal
debt structure. The value of the nominal debt is negative (corresponding to positive nominal bond
16 The inﬂation rate between period t − 1 and t, πt,i sd e ﬁned as πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 − 1.
13holdings),
P∞
t=θ+1 Qθ+1,t θBt = −0.918, most of which matures in period θ +1 . This value of the
nominal debt is exactly equal to the money stock discounted by the adjustment factor on the right
side of equation (26). The real value of the nominal bonds maturing in each period is constant
from period θ +2 : θBt/Pt = −0.009 (t ≥ θ +2 ) . Since government θ +1does not have the same
possibility of a surprise inﬂation, its cost of public funds is somewhat higher: λθ+1 =0 .542.
Example 2 Suppose instead that the initial nominal debt for government θ matures in period
θ +1rather than period θ: θ−1Bθ =0 , θ−1Bθ+1 =1 ,a n dθ−1Bt =0(t ≥ θ +2 ) . All the other




cθ =0 .399,c θ+1 =0 .304,c t =0 .291 (t ≥ θ +2 ) ,
mθ =0 .524,m θ+1 =0 .700,m t =0 .759 (t ≥ θ +2 ) .
The money stock is lower than in example 1, corresponding to the lower surprise inﬂation. The
initial real balances are higher than in example 1, and the initial price level is lower. Thus, the
initial amount of surprise inﬂation is lower. The present value of the initial nominal debt is lower,
since it matures one period later and the interest rate is high. Therefore, the marginal beneﬁto f
surprise inﬂation is lower than in example 1. If this had been anticipated in period θ−1, the interest
rate in period θ would have been iθ =0 .792. Future nominal interest rates are still substantial,
iθ+1 =0 .432 and it =0 .340 (t ≥ θ +2 ), as are inﬂation rates: πθ+1 =0 .491 and πt =0 .229
(t ≥ θ +2 ). The tax rates satisfy τθ =0 .004, τθ+1 =0 .274,a n dτt =0 .306 (t ≥ θ +2 ). The cost
of public funds satisﬁes λθ =0 .466.
To implement the Ramsey policy in the future, government θ should leave government θ +1
with
θBθ+1 = −0.151, θBθ+2 = −0.028,
∞ X
t=θ+1
Qθ+1,t θBt = −0.362,
θbθ+1 = −0.319, θbt =0 .175 (t ≥ θ +2 ) .
Again, to prevent government θ +1from engaging in surprise inﬂation, the money stock is oﬀset
by negative nominal debt, although of less magnitude than in example 1. Note how incentive
compatibility reverses the size and sign of the nominal debt maturing in θ +1from one period to
14the next: θ−1Bθ =1and θBθ+1 = −0.151. The real value of the nominal bonds maturing in each
period is constant from period θ +2 : θBt/Pt = −0.008 (t ≥ θ +2 ). The cost of public funds for
government θ +1is again higher than for government θ: λθ+1 =0 .528.
6 Relation to earlier work
Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1987) PPS assumed that end-of-period real balances enter
the period utility function. That is, the period utility function is U(ct,x t, ˜ mt), where
˜ mt ≡ Mt/Pt (37)
denotes end-of-period real balances. The objective function for government θ becomes
˜ Vθ( ˜ Xθ) ≡
∞ X
t=θ
βt−θU(ct,1 − gt − ct, ˜ mt),
where ˜ Xθ ≡ {ct, ˜ mt}∞
t=θ. Importantly, the objective function no longer depends directly on the
price level in period θ, Pθ. This means that unanticipated inﬂation has no direct eﬀect on consumer
utility, only an indirect eﬀect via the government’s intertemporal budget constraint and changes in
the real value of the government’s nominal liabilities and distortionary taxation.
The consumer’s intertemporal budget constraint becomes
∞ P
t=θ
qθ,t(1 − τt)(1 − xt)+qθ,θMθ−1/Pθ +
∞ P
t=θ










where we use (5) and (37). Optimal consumer choices lead to the ﬁrst-order conditions (7) and
(8) with qθ,t and τt, so the functions qθ,t = q,t(ct) and τt = τ(ct) are still given by (14) and (15).







Thus, the function it = i(ct,m t) for t ≥ θ +1deﬁned by (16) is replaced by it+1 =˜ ı(ct, ˜ mt) for
t ≥ θ +1deﬁned by (38), and the function Qθ,t(Xθ) is replaced by Qθ,t( ˜ Xθ) deﬁned as in (13) and
(38). The net wealth of government θ satisﬁes
˜ Wθ(Pθ, ˜ Xθ) ≡
∞ X
t=θ




˜ ı(ct, ˜ mt)







Qθ,t( ˜ Xθ) θ−1Bt
¶
/Pθ. (39)
15The optimization problem of government θ can be written as
max
Pθ, ˜ Xθ
˜ Vθ( ˜ Xθ) subject to (40)
˜ Wθ(Pθ, ˜ Xθ) ≥ 0, (41)
with the following ﬁrst-order conditions for an optimum:
λθ
∂ ˜ W(Pθ, ˜ Xθ)
∂Pθ
=0 , (42)
∂ ˜ Vθ( ˜ Xθ)
∂ct
+ λθ
∂ ˜ W(Pθ, ˜ Xθ)
∂ct
=0 ( t ≥ θ), (43)
∂ ˜ Vθ( ˜ Xθ)
∂mt
+ λθ
∂ ˜ W(Pθ, ˜ Xθ)
∂mt
=0 ( t ≥ θ). (44)
In this case, the ﬁrst-order condition for the initial price level of the subsequent government, Pθ+1,




Qθ+1,t θBt =0 . (45)
Compared to (25), the direct utility eﬀect of unanticipated inﬂation is missing. The ﬁrst-order
condition states what PPS proposed, namely that government θ should leave government θ +1
with positive nominal bond holdings (that is,
P∞
t=θ+1 Qθ+1,t θBt < 0) equal in value to the money
stock such that the net nominal liabilities of government θ +1are zero.
Calvo and Obstfeld (1990) Although the condition (45) appears simple and intuitive, CO
showed, via an informal variation argument, that it actually does not correspond to an optimum.
















1+˜ ı(cs, ˜ ms)
!
, (46)
so as to make the government’s net nominal liabilities negative (positive). Given negative (positive)
net nominal liabilities, the government can increase ˜ Wθ+1 and slacken the government’s intertem-
poral budget constraint by decreasing (increasing) Pθ+1. This, in turn, allows the government to
adjust ˜ Xθ+1 to use up that slack and increase ˜ Vθ+1. Consequently, the initial situation cannot be
an optimum.
Note that this argument crucially hinges on unanticipated inﬂation having no direct eﬀect on
consumer utility. If ˜ Vθ+1 would depend directly on Pθ+1, as when beginning-of-period real balances
enter into the utility function, the CO argument no longer goes through.
16Alvarez, Kehoe, and Neumeyer (2004) AKN considered the same model with end-of-period
real balances. In particular, they made assumptions on consumer preferences such that the Ramsey
policy in period θ satisﬁes the Friedman rule, it+1 =0( t ≥ θ). They assumed that consumption
and real balances are weakly homogeneously separable from leisure,
U(ct,x t, ˜ mt) ≡ u(w(ct, ˜ mt),x t), (47)
where w(ct, ˜ mt) is homothetic (and with no loss of generality can be assumed to be homogeneous).
This implies that consumption and leisure are quasi-separable from leisure: the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and real balances along a given ray in the real balance—
consumption plane is independent of leisure along a given indiﬀerence surface,t h a ti s ,f o rag i v e n
utility level.17 Deaton [6] has shown that quasi-separability of a group of goods implies that uniform
tax rates on the (constant) production costs of these goods are optimal. The optimal tax on real
balances is then the product of the optimal tax rate and the production cost of real balances. Since
the production cost of real balances is assumed to be zero and the optimal tax rate is bounded, it
follows that the optimal tax on real balances is zero. Since we can interpret it
1+it as the tax on real
balances, the Friedman rule follows.18
Under the assumption of a satiation point for real balances (whatever the real allocation), we
thus have
it+1 =˜ ı(ct, ˜ mt)=U˜ m(ct,1 − gt − ct, ˜ mt)=0 ( t ≥ θ) (48)
for the optimal allocation ˜ Xθ = {ct, ˜ mt}∞
t=θ. Under the assumption that the period utility function









As in PPS, the ﬁrst-order condition for government θ +1for Pθ+1, (42), is only satisﬁed when
17 The utility function (36) is additively separable and therefore weakly separable. Hence, it can be written as
ut = u(wt,x t),w h e r ewt = w(ct,m t) ≡ [(1−ct)
2 +(1−mt)
2]/2. However, the function w(ct,m t) is not homothetic.
When, xt is adjusted, wt has to be adjusted in order to keep the total utility, ut = u(wt,x t), constant. Along a
given ray in the real balance—consumption plane (mt = αct for some α>0), when wt varies, the marginal rate of
substitution between real balances and consumption, (1−mt)/(1 −ct)=( 1−αct)/(1−ct), is not independent of ct
and wt. Therefore, the utility function (36) is not quasi-separable, and the uniform-taxation result does not apply.
18 Teles [12] provides a survey of some results on the optimality of the Friedman rule and emphasizes the crucial
role of the (near-)zero production costs of real balances for the separability and uniform-taxation assumptions to
imply (approximately) the Friedman rule.




θBt =0 . (50)
AKN proposed that government θ imposes the following maturity structure on its successor (see
below)
θBθ+1 = −Mθ, (51)
θBt =0 ( t ≥ θ +2 ) , (52)
that is, government θ leaves only nominal bonds that mature in period θ+1and no nominal assets
or liabilities of longer maturity. The ﬁrst-order condition for ˜ mt for t ≥ θ +1 ,( 4 4 ) ,i s




















Under (48) and (49), all terms in (53) are zero, even if (52) is not satisﬁed. Finally, the ﬁrst-order
condition for ct for t ≥ θ +1 ,( 4 3 ) ,i s
βt−θ−1(Uct − Uxt)=λθ+1
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
− [τt(ct + gt) − gt − θbt]
∂qθ+1,t
∂ct












⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬





− [τt(ct + gt) − gt − θbt]
∂qθ+1,t
∂ct





(t ≥ θ +1 ) , (54)
where, under the Friedman rule, the last line follows from (48) and (49). If (52) is satisﬁed, the
term involving nominal debt on the right side is zero regardless of (49).
Condition (54) is equivalent to the ﬁrst-order condition for ct (t ≥ θ+1)for government θ+1in
a real economy without money, as in LS and Persson and Svensson [8]. It determines the indexed
debt structure θb ≡ {θbt}∞
t=θ+1 that ensures time consistency under discretion of the optimal
policy under commitment. Moreover, the conditions (51) and (52) make net nominal liabilities zero
and eliminate any nominal bonds with maturity longer than one period. The condition of zero
net nominal liabilities removes any incentive for surprise inﬂation or deﬂation. Furthermore, the
condition of no long nominal debt implies that the informal variation argument CO used for PPS
does not apply, because it requires nominal debt of longer maturity than one period.
AKN explicitly assumed that government θ must have inherited zero net nominal liabilities
from government θ − 1, and so forth. Indeed, the ﬁrst government in history that computes the
18Ramsey policy must have initial net nominal liabilities at all maturities equal to zero. If the initial
net nominal liabilities are not all zero, the initial government would ﬁnd it optimal to manipulate
the initial price level directly, or along the lines of the CO variational argument. If initial net
nominal liabilities are negative, by lowering the initial price level the government can eﬀectively
impose a suﬃcient lumpsum tax instead of distortionary labor taxes. In this case, the Ramsey
policy would be trivial, as the government would not need to impose any distortions when raising
revenue. If initial net nominal liabilities are positive, the government would attempt to increase
the price level beyond any ﬁnite level, so as to reduce the real value of those liabilities to zero.
Obviously, the condition of zero net nominal liabilities at all maturities is very strong. In our case
with beginning-of-period real balances and a direct utility cost of surprise inﬂation, by contrast, a
nontrivial Ramsey policy requires only that the ﬁrst government’s initial net nominal liabilities be
positive, which they usually are in the real world.
As AKN observed, under the Friedman rule, the economy essentially becomes a real economy
at the Ramsey optimum. On the margin, money does not supply any transactions services and is
just a store of value in the same way as indexed bonds. Since anticipated inﬂation does not raise
any revenue, the only meaningful tradeoﬀ in the government’s optimal tax problem concerns labor
tax distortions at diﬀerent points in time. But the empirically relevant case for many countries
and periods is a genuine monetary economy where the inﬂation tax is a source of some revenue
to be traded oﬀ against other distorting means of raising revenue. With beginning-of-period real
balances and a direct utility cost of surprise inﬂation, we can ﬁnd conditions for a time consistent
Ramsey policy in such economies, as demonstrated by our analysis in sections 3—5.
7C o n c l u s i o n
Earlier work by Calvo [3], Lucas and Stokey [7], Calvo and Obstfeld [4]), and Alvarez, Kehoe,
and Neumeyer [2] suggests that time inconsistency of the Ramsey policy in monetary economies is
either unavoidable, or avoidable only in environments where the Friedman rule is optimal so that
the monetary economy is isomorphic to a real economy.
In contrast, and in line with Persson, Persson, and Svensson’s [10] unpublished extension of
Persson, Persson, and Svensson [9], we show that time consistency of the Ramsey policy is possible
also in economies where monetary policy plays a signiﬁcant role and positive interest rates optimally
r a i s es o m er e v e n u e . T i m ec o n s i s t e n c yo ft h eR a m sey policy requires an active debt-management
19policy, where each government leaves to its successor a unique maturity structure of the nominal
and indexed debt. The Ramsey policy may very well entail non-constant interest rates, inﬂation,
and taxes, even if private preferences and endowments and government consumption are constant.
We show these results in a model where agents derive liquidity services from the money bal-
ances held at the beginning, rather than the end, of any time period. More generally, the critical
assumption is that unanticipated inﬂation, realistically, imposes some direct cost on the private
sector.
References
[1] Alvarez, Fernando, Patrick J. Kehoe, and Pablo Andrés Neumeyer (2002), “The Time Con-
sistency of Monetary and Fiscal Policies,” Research Department Staﬀ Report 305, Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
[2] Alvarez, Fernando, Patrick J. Kehoe, and Pablo Andrés Neumeyer (2004), “The Time Consis-
tency of Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policies,” Econometrica 72, 541—567.
[3] Calvo, Guillermo A. (1978), “On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary
Economy,” Econometrica 46, 1411—1428.
[4] Calvo, Guillermo A., and Maurice Obstfeld (1990), “Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary
Policy: A Comment,” Econometrica 58, 1245—1247.
[5] Danthine, Jean-Pierre., and John B. Donaldson (1986), “Inﬂa t i o na n dA s s e tP r i c e si na n
Exchange Economy,” Econometrica 54, 585—606.
[6] Deaton, Angus (1981), “Optimal Taxes and the Structure of Preferences,” Econometrica 49,
1245—1260.
[7] Lucas, Robert E., and Nancy L. Stokey (1983), “Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in an
Economy without Capital,” Journal of Monetary Economics 12, 55—93.
[8] Persson, Torsten, and Lars E.O. Svensson (1984), “Time-Consistent Fiscal Policy and Gov-
ernment Cash Flow,” Journal of Monetary Economics 14, 365—374.
[9] Persson, Mats, Torsten Persson, and Lars E.O. Svensson (1987), “Time Consistency of Fiscal
and Monetary Policy,” Econometrica 55, 1419—1431.
20[10] Persson, Mats, Torsten Persson, and Lars E.O. Svensson (1989), “Time Consistency of Fiscal
and Monetary Policy: A Reply,” IIES Seminar Paper No. 427.
[11] Persson, Mats, Torsten Persson, and Lars E.O. Svensson (1998), “Debt, Cash Flow and Inﬂa-
tion Incentives: A Swedish Example,” in Mervyn A. King and Guillermo A. Calvo, eds., The
Debt Burden and its Consequences for Monetary Policy, MacMillan, London, 28—62.
[12] Teles, Pedro (2003), “The Optimal Price of Money,” Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Eco-




SEMINAR PAPER SERIES 
 





718. Harry Flam      Turkey and the EU: Politics and Economics of Accession. 
 
719. Assar Lindbeck      An Essay on Welfare State Dynamics. 
 
720. Gino A. Gancia      Globalization, Divergence and Stagnation. 
 
721. Dirk Niepelt      Tax Evasion Dynamics. 
 
722. Dirk Niepelt  Intra-Generational Conflict: The Role of Balanced Budget 
Rules. 
 
723. Peter Svedberg and    The Real Real Price of Nonrenewable Resources: Copper 1870-   
        John E. Tilton      2000.   
 
724. Peter Svedberg      World Income Distribution: Which Way?  
 
725. Assar Lindbeck and    The Firm as a Pool of Factor Complementarities 
        Dennis Snower 
 
726. Davide Ticchi and    Endogenous Constitutions 




727. Conny Olovsson     Why do Europeans Work so Little? 
 
728. Conny Olovsson     The Welfare Gains of Improving Risk Sharing in Social Security 
 
729. Conny Olovsson     Social Security and the Equity Premium Puzzle 
 
730. Claes Bengtsson,    Gender  and  Overconfidence 
        Mats Persson and 
        Peter Willenhag 
 
731. Martín Gonzalez-Eiras    Sustaining Social Security 









732. Dirk Niepelt      Social Security Reform: Economics and Politics 
 
733. Assar Lindbeck and     Improving the SGP: Taxes and Delegation rather than Fines 




734. Mats Persson,        Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy: A Solution 
        Torsten Persson,  




Institute for International Economic Studies 
 